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FOREWORD
What is commonly known as history is really the
past, as it is often selected and preserved both by professional historians and by non-specialist citizens. The
past is such a large and diverse repository of happenings, thoughts, and experiences that it requires treatment with a disciplined respect. Frequently, respect for
the truth about the past is a victim of contemporary circumstance. In this monograph, Dr. Colin S. Gray seeks
to explore how historical data might best be used for
the benefit of the U.S. Army and, therefore, the United
States. He pulls no punches in explaining how challenging it is to penetrate the fog that obscures much of
the past. Since the future cannot be foreseen reliably,
we are left rather uncomfortably with a seemingly ever
changing today.
Despite the difficulties that are soon found by
efforts to identify lessons from history, Dr. Gray does
believe there are a few major precepts to which respectful attention should be paid. For example, he states and
argues in this monograph that the decision to wage
war is always a gamble, despite the many advantages
owned by the United States in most circumstances. In
particular, thinking especially of such unhappy protracted episodes as the conduct of warfare in Vietnam,
Afghanistan, and Iraq, the work is impressed by the
extent and depth of the American lack of knowledge
and understanding of combat zones. The author hopes
that this modest study will help American soldiers
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cope with the huge scope and mass of potential data
from the relevant past.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
This monograph examines the potential utility of
history as a source of education and possible guidance
for the U.S. Army. The author considers the worth in
the claim that since history (more accurately termed
the past) is all done and gone, it can have no value for
today as we try to look forward. This point of view
did not find much favor here. The monograph argues
that although history does not repeat itself in detail,
it certainly does so roughly in parallel circumstances.
Of course, much detail differs from one historical case
to another, but nonetheless, there are commonly broad
and possibly instructive parallels that can be drawn
from virtually every period of history, concerning
most circumstances.
An argument that finds very little favor here is that
attracted to claims for the value of assertions of historical analogy. This monograph suggests that the strict
requirements for detailed evidence that is required for
credible claims of analogy are effectively impossible
to meet. Since it can be important not to lose all grasp
of the comparison, the idea—perhaps the habit—
of claiming historical analogy should be dropped.
Instead, a much more useful concept that avoids the
error of foolish analogy is the idea of the historical parallel. The parallel claim conveys the core of the analogical one, while expediently saving us from the need to
try to make claims that are bound to exceed the accessible evidence.
We explore and carefully consider the popular
idea expressed by writer L. P. Hartley half a century
ago that “the past is a foreign country.” This idea is
important and remains quite popular, but it does not
withstand careful criticism. Controversially, I am sure
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this monograph, though recognizing and welcoming
much change in world affairs, is unconvinced that
truly major themes in human political and spiritual
life have altered significantly over the centuries. While
nearly all of the detail and what may be termed dismissively as the decorative and even mechanical features
of private and public life have changed greatly over
the past 2 centuries, the values of morality, politics,
and the connections between effort and reward, have
not really altered at all. For a leading example, the
standard and traditional formula of ends, ways, and
means (and assumptions) works for the interpretation
of all cultures, in all periods of history. The reason is
because the interdependence of the four vital ideas,
at all times and in all circumstances, enjoys the rare
status of being a truth for the whole human race, and it
is an important key for unlocking the details of many
disparate civilizations.
The analysis here is not unfriendly to the idea of
change, but it is unimpressed with many claims for
alteration that are not, in fact, evidence of radical
improvement. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, relatively
little with the highest value for human life is found to
have changed over a long passage of time. By way of
empirical evidence for this argument, the aspirations
and achievements, as well as many of the crimes, as we
might choose to label them, continue to make sense to
us. It is impressive that three of the four greatest books
on war, statecraft, and strategy were written millennia
in the past, while the most outstanding book on land
warfare, by Carl von Clausewitz, was first published
184 years ago.
Among the conclusions reached in this analysis is the important thought that history teaches no
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lessons—it is historians who do that. The study reaches
four significant conclusions; they are the following:
1. Behave prudently (meaning with regard for
the consequences of action).
2. Remember the concept of the great stream
of time.
3. Do not forget that war nearly always is a
gamble.
4. War should only be waged with strategic
sense.
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WHAT SHOULD THE U.S. ARMY LEARN FROM
HISTORY?
RECOVERY FROM A STRATEGY DEFICIT
INTRODUCTION: SHOULD THE U.S. ARMY
LEARN FROM HISTORY?
It is my contention that the late British author and
dramatist, L. P. Hartley, was substantially in error
when he offered audiences the potent thought that
“the past is a foreign country: they do things differently
there.”1 It is an assumption for this monograph that
history offers much from which the U.S. Army could
learn. However, this analysis approaches the injunction in the title principally as a hypothesis to be tested,
rather than as a great and solemnly reliable truth. The
trouble is that there is no such thing as history. History
is what historians write, and historians are part of the
process they are writing about as well.2 The Hartley
quote is particularly instructive for two reasons. First,
it offers a very plausible common thought that today
approaches the status of being an all but revealed truth
that speaks sense to a common error. Second, in the
opinion of this scholar, Hartley is seriously mistaken
in his understanding of history, at least in the level of
his understanding, which I deem to be somewhat shallow. That said, the facts remain that Hartley’s striking
thought and particularly his choice of words merits
our serious attention and even much respect. There is
a notable plausibility about Hartley’s phrase-making
that commands attention. In short, he expresses what
reads like a well-considered conviction resting upon
an impressive pile of historical evidence! However, we
ought to ask: Is it true?—notwithstanding its apparent
plausibility.
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A prior question must be posed before one seeks
to tackle this topic. An unavoidable issue of legitimacy precedes that of topicality. Is it sensible simply
to assume that history carries meaning for us today?
The idea of our learning from whatever we decide history to be deserves to be regarded as a proposition for
disciplined consideration, not as a matter that already
is comfortably settled. Our past is not only one with
a dynamic national boundary, but also one that both
has, and provides context for, the national narratives
of other peoples. It is not hard to see how complex the
idea of history rapidly can become.
Fortunately, this monograph is designed to answer
a particular need of the U.S. Army for specific advice
on what should be learned from history. An obvious
problem here is the need to decide on a rule for the
education in question. Common sense must be our
practical guide, even though it requires toleration of
unpoliced intellectual frontiers. A large and general
issue could be, but will not be, debated here. Specifically, there is a highly significant difference between
history and the past. In popular discussion, and also
unfortunately in professional scholarship, history is
the human story usually framed and drafted to promote a specific narrative, and the past is simply the
real story of what happened, why, and to whom. The
latter concept is close in reality to the early medieval
chronicles. By and large, authors today have a point
of view that they wish to project, and we live in a society that permits this. The subject of this monograph
may appear unmanageably broad, but in reality, one
assumes that authors debating the proper valuable use
of historical evidence will be guided in detail by a set
of assumptions. These assumptions will be believed
both to be widely shared within American society, and
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endorsed by the institutions licensing the research,
writing, and dissemination of the view expressed. It
is plausible to argue that monographs written for the
educational purposes of the U.S. Army are near certain
to reflect assumptions friendly to concerns for national
security. A possible lack of objectivity is not really relevant to my argument, because I am stating a necessary truth. When we learn from our history, there is
no avoiding the consequences of the particular details
that, as individuals, we cannot help but bring to the
exercise. It can be a challenge for scholars, including
those who attempt to educate soldiers more fully, to
avoid permitting bias to defeat education.
Soldiers, among many others, may learn from the
history that they are taught that the righteous side did
not always win. This possible judgment ought not to
disturb students who already have been introduced to
the culturally challenging notion that America could
and did lose some wars, or at least some phases of particular wars—even if the whole wartime narration is
more kind. Military students in most countries know
that defeats happen occasionally, and they learn that
the whole course of national military history is not one
of unblemished success. Indeed, it is important for an
institution that seeks to teach the national strategic
narrative to be able to teach also the facts concerning
occasional military failure. Historically, American soldiers have needed to be educated by the reality of failure as well as victory. From time to time, especially
when introduced into what becomes the late stage
of a war, the U.S. Army has been seriously short of
combat skills—at least for a brief period.3 For example,
a German enemy provided rapid on the job training.
From time to time, historical judgements are presented and quite plausibly rejected as irrelevant. A
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principal problem is created not by the appeal to
what is claimed to be history, but much rather by the
careful selection of episodes in the past on which the
requirements for evidence are levied. While it is commonplace to reject possible and potential evidence of
sound or apparently unsound behavior, it is not usually feasible to evade the problem created by our foreknowledge entirely. This is probably the oldest and
least forgiving of authorial sins. Specifically, we know
what happened and cannot pretend convincingly that
we do not. When a complete historical narrative is
well known, it is tempting simply to ignore the possibly glittering paths that were not explored. A professional historian generally will not touch interesting
plot inventions adopted even for the purpose of illustrating of an argument judged worthy of presentation,
explanation, and augmentation. If an author chooses
to liven up their narrative, he or she may lose the necessary anchor of well-evidenced actuality that helps
keep him or her from slipping into the realm of fiction.
As it is, the interdependence of fiction and non-fiction
can pose a significant challenge to an understanding of
the past, without inviting a new source of fiction to join
the party. This author has never felt compelled to use
deliberate fiction in order to strengthen an argument.
I have always felt that the uncertainties of contemporary strategic fiction were sufficiently exciting as not to
need colorful embellishment.
The utility argument in praise of research on the
future rapidly runs into the venture stopping problem
that, since the future by scientific definition has yet to
happen, it is quite a challenge to assess any weight of
evidence in (self) praise of one’s own foresight! Fortunately, we are not quite as blind on the future as I
may have just appeared to suggest. Nonetheless, the
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nature and number of genuine certainties is quite limited, despite their high significance.
Perhaps the most helpful thought one can offer on
the likely value of history for our security tomorrow
is the following: today is only tomorrow’s yesterday.
If nothing else, it should encourage a rare humility in
futurologists.
UNDERSTANDING THE PAST: A FOREIGN
COUNTRY?
This belief is as popular, even if often regretted,
as actually it is exceedingly dubious. The differences
from past to present and on into the future certainly
are considerable, but often they tend not to relate to
the deeper phenomena that bear on our human performance. There is a good and readily understandable
reason why this should be so. Specifically, for reasons
of personal security, we human beings find it necessary to live in groups, or societies, great or small in
size. In order to live with tolerable security in a society—any society—we need guidance as to the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable behavior.
The group, or society if you prefer, into which we all
happen to be born, in every contemporary political
geography and also in every known period in history,
finds it necessary to instruct its children about the difference between rightful and wrongful behaviors. Similarly, all people, everywhere, are subject to parental
and societal influence.
Over millennia and in very different geographies,
most peoples, certainly the socially and politically successful ones, have been able to adapt to what could
prove to be challenging geographical and human
political and strategic conditions. However, extreme
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conditions of stress have not generally resulted in truly
extreme consequences of a kind that repudiated what
went before. Even when there have been noteworthy
violent interruptions to the normal conditions of civilized life, one finds that the most obvious changes in
political, social, and military affairs are less traumatic
than appeared the case on a more superficial assessment. The more closely we examine, and the more
broadly we consider the past, the more familiar it
seems with reference to our contemporary times.
A trap we need to be careful to try to avoid is the
drawing of powerful sweeping conclusions based on
singular, outstanding, and quite possibly unusual historical happenings. In short, we need to try to avoid
being over-impressed by individual, perhaps stand
alone, occurrences or even inventions. The argument
that advances the potent proposition that the past is
a foreign country is true in the main, but there are
important respects in which the argument should be
dismissed as a plausible fallacy. Of particular interest is the subject of human behavior and misbehavior.
This author has often been impressed by the similarities between contemporary people and those in the
time of Ancient Greece and Rome.4 While there can be
no doubt that imperial politics in the Roman Empire
could have a distinctly rough edge for the losers in
power struggles, the probable motivation and temptations appear substantially comprehensible to today.
The range of possibility in human physiology and
psychology has not altered dramatically through the
centuries. If that were not so, we should probably not
be able to read Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian
War with much understanding of the politics, tactics,
operations, and strategies it seeks to explain.5 Not
only is Thucydides’ book the outstanding work from a
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period of intense intercity strife 2,400 years in the past,
but particularly when well translated from the challenging Greek-style in which it was written, it speaks
clearly to us today. Former Secretary of State General
George C. Marshall argued that one could not be a fully
competent contemporary observer of international
politics if one were not familiar with Thucydides.6 Of
course, fashions, habits, and legally permissible tactics, operations, and strategies have changed over the
centuries, but the morality theme in the human tale
has not altered unrecognizably.7 The stories in Shakespeare’s plays that are set in times even then long past
do not require translation for today, any more than do
his late 16th-century plays.
Probably the most difficult challenge one needs to
face in striving to make moral, social, political, and strategic sense of historical figures is the need to attempt
to understand the largely silent assumptions made by
them.8 It is in the nature and character of assumptions
that typically they contain or imply beliefs that do not
require explicit justification or even expression. We
function day to day on the basis of assumptions, as did
all the historical figures in whom we have an interest.
An assumption is a belief that is accepted as true, even
though the evidence on its behalf may be shaky at best.
A common problem posed to historians by the phenomenon of the assumption is the widespread reality
of a genuine lack of self-knowledge in its respect. An
assumption can be regarded as a belief in support of
which we have not sought persuasive evidence. An
assumption is a belief that is beyond, or even above,
evidence. By their nature, assumptions pose tough
challenges to the historian. It can be a difficult idea
to convey to young people, because it challenges the
scientific spirit of our era. When properly explained,
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much, though not all, of the difficulty vanishes. The
challenge lies in the requirement to believe, or at least
accept, that particular claims are true, or likely to be
true enough, in the face of a lack of what usually is
understood as supportive evidence. Emphatically, this
does not mean that an assumption is wrong, only that
it is not supported by what is regarded as tolerably
accurate evidence. The understanding of what should
be considered accurate evidence typically requires
effort and empirical results.
An understanding of assumptions is important
because all human behavior—past, present, and presumably future—is driven by people who cannot help
making and holding them. Assumptions are crucially
significant for our values, moral compass, and choices.
The historical experience from which we expect and
require American soldiers to be both inspired and
warned is shot through with collective, but also individual, distinctively moral choices between better and
worse behavior. Students of history, both national
and foreign, learn at a young age that they inhabit
and must conduct themselves in a society founded
upon a code of what is regarded as morally acceptable
behavior. When studying history, the student is introduced to a wide spread of behaviors that the teacher
will explain either in generally positive or negative
terms. Students probably will not recognize the reality of their situation, but that context will always be a
moral one. Students will be exposed to both more and
less successful examples of the human experience, but
regardless of the details of time and place, the teacher
will be explaining about a morally structured world.
The students always will be taught the differences
between positive and negative performances, both collective and individual. Regardless if one is studying
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Thucydides or Julius Caesar, the relevant universe for
action in history is a moral one. Ideas, standards, and
laws have varied widely, but we humans have always
found it necessary to endorse an ethical code expressing notions of morally acceptable behavior.
PERSISTING CONCERNS AND ENDURING
HAZARDS
In order for a false belief to be exposed as a fallacy,
it first needs to be recognized as seriously flawed. Only
then, once expressed to public view and possibly confronted with contrary empirical evidence, can the truth
be established. The most obvious difficulty with falsity
of assumptions for soldiers and their political masters is that prediction is a notably uncertain activity in
human political and strategic affairs. This condition of
uncertainty is particularly acute for America’s soldiers,
given that the most crucial aspects of their professional
readiness all but require them to achieve the impossible with anticipation of the future. Given that reliable
prediction of the future is not a physical, mechanical,
or electronic possibility for us, we need to examine our
history in a search for guidance on prudent international behavior.9
Sometimes it is a dominant truth in international
politics that the United States ought not to be cast in
the role of principal actor, meaning that foreign concerns and decisions lead the way in deciding when,
and possibly where, the country is moved to commit
to violent action. Regarding the whole of the 20th century, we were ready neither for the World Wars (1917,
1941) nor for the limited ones (1950, 1965, and 2001).
The country hoped to be able to sit out both World
Wars, but that proved impossible. The falsehood of
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American assumptions about its international context and prudent choices was revealed fairly conclusively in 1917 and yet more so in 1941. It soon became
obvious that the political assumptions upon the basis
of which military policy was founded were unsound.
The most popular beliefs about the country’s national
security were erroneous both in 1917 and 1941. More
arguably, perhaps, the Truman administration, which
enjoys almost a stellar reputation today for its eventual
management of Soviet peril concerning the balance of
power in Europe and much of Asia, was caught unprepared over nuclear weapons both materially and conceptually in Korea in 1950.
The most serious weakness in the American way
of war since World War II has been what deserves to
be labeled the strategy deficit.10 The theory of strategy
is almost brutally clear in the emphasis it places upon
the political meaning that there needs to be to all warfighting, actual or potential.11 Admittedly, the problem
is a political one for the whole of American national
security, not a narrow challenge solely to the American conduct of war. Repeatedly in armed conflicts in
the second half of the 20th century and the opening
decade of the 21st, the United States waged war (in
Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq) with too little effort
being devoted to the whole narrative and context of
conflict. A U.S. military effort and the political energy
that it generated should have learned from history
that warfare is always really about politics and must
have political consequences. This was true for Ancient
Greece and Rome, neither less nor more than for the
contemporary United States. Strict logic, common
sense, and abundant historical experience should be
allowed to tell us that what strategy is about are the
consequences of military action or sometimes inaction.
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It can be difficult to bear this point in mind, but all
military behavior has some political meaning, great or
small. Military behavior in times of peace and of war
always has political consequences, both anticipated or
not and desired or otherwise.
Just as military use always has consequences—ones
less than accurately anticipated—they are frequently
surprising. This is a plain generically repeated lesson
from most historical experiences. The root problem, of
course, is the unpredictability of the future. The pertinent challenge to us is to identify the elements in
history that bear significantly upon the security and
general well-being of the American people, but which
are not unduly vulnerable to thoughts and actions that
malign individuals and institutions. This is a tough
but not impossible task, hence the feasibility of this
monograph. In a later section of this monograph, I
risk identifying the lessons that American soldiers
can and should derive from their study of history—
not just American history. Prominent among these
lessons is the condition that well merits the title used
in this monograph, a strategy deficit. The problem
has not been especially difficult to identify, but it has
been nearly impossible to correct. The very structure
of American governance, with the constitutional protection of a separation of powers, almost guarantees
a probability of considerable difficulty with respect to
the provision of a sound balancing of ends, ways, and
means. Strategy is by far the most challenging activity,
as contrasted with policy and military tactics, so it is no
surprise that it has posed difficulties that are unusual
in their severity. This unremarkable conclusion was
reached in a recent major study by the RAND Corporation. Attempting to summarize why the American
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national security effort over the past 13 years has been
unsatisfactory, the study argued the following:
First, civilian policymakers and the U.S. military have
different conceptions of how policy and strategy should
be made. Second, policymakers have a tendency to
eschew strategy and focus on tactical issues. Third,
and perhaps most important, is a desire to pursue a
technocratic approach to strategy that aligns tactical
and operational successes without securing the ultimate
objectives sought. Finally, policymakers and military
leaders may not see strategy as an essentially adaptive art
for coping with the uncertainties of war and the lack of
perfect knowledge. A significant body of scholarship has
identified these issues, and some effort has been made to
increase and improve education in strategy, but a wider
appreciation of the degree to which this deficit produces
suboptimal national security outcomes may be lacking.12

With the advance in military-relevant technology
as the leading contemporary example, we know that it
has to be a reliably safe bet for us to anticipate a continuation of the still maturing digital revolution. Historical experience cannot advise as to which technical and
behavioral solutions should and will find most favor
with the Army in the future, but we can be totally confident in expecting adequate answers to be located.
Looking forward to yet an even more digital age (and
beyond), the study of history tells us that the age-old
competition between technical offense and defense is
certain to continue. After all, since such competition,
if sometimes very slow, has been characteristic literally for millennia, why should it stop now? There is,
and will never be, a final technical move (that we could
survive). The pace of technical change accelerates and
decelerates, driven substantially by appreciation of
perceived acute military need. The only technology to
date to have evaded reliably certain technical negation
12

is the weaponization of atomic energy.13 However,
American soldiers, among others, can hardly have
avoided noticing that for the 72 years since Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons have played a notable background role on behalf of American national
security. The point is not that nuclear weapons do not
much matter, which would be far from the truth, but
rather that typically they are allowed to play little part
in America’s explicit statecraft. They are uniquely valuable, indeed literally indispensable, but they appear to
have played only a key contextual role. This is not a
criticism; long may nuclear-armed forces be assigned
only a background role! The answer to the technical
challenge posed by nuclear weapons has been consistently clear. We accept nuclear weapons as having a
prospectively permanent character as a military threat
to which there is no thoroughly reliable solution for
negation. Since the mid–1950s, we have accepted a condition of mutual deterrence as being the best, indeed
the only, solution to the military problems posed by
Soviet nuclear-armed forces. The danger posed by a
small number of nuclear weapons has meant that even
warfare on behalf of vital interests has acquired an all
but impossible quality of risk. However, this condition of acute danger, with nuclear peril overhanging
great-power politics, has had an arguably surprisingly
limited effect on America’s military activity. Korea,
Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, assayed cumulatively
have been extensive enterprises. I am tempted to comment that for a nuclear well-armed superpower, the
United States, and its Army in particular, has had a
busy and indeed a hard and trying time.
Modern history tells us that the United States lost its
wars in Vietnam, and probably Afghanistan and Iraq.
It is hard to maintain credibly that American backed
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arms were proven undoubtedly successful in recent
conflicts. So much for the unsatisfactory military historical record. On the plus side of the historical ledger
we must record the successful defense of South Korea
and, above all else, the framing and persistent execution of a defense strategy for the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) countries of Western Europe. It
is perhaps ironic that America’s greatest success in the
field of competitive international security was in Western and Central Europe, where nuclear dangers were
most acute. The scale of danger may have promoted
prudence, but still history must record a bold, successful, and vital nuclear grand strategy effected largely by
the United States. Today, the Soviet peril has been at
least partially born again in the unpleasant character
of the new authoritarian Russia under Vladimir Putin.
In addition, the hazards in mutual nuclear deterrence
continue to lurk, possibly in dark unpredictable corners, and thereby, especially in dangerous ways.
In conflict after conflict, the U.S. military establishment, alongside its many strengths, has revealed the
same weakness—in strategy. As is well known, there
is not or should not be a need for savior generalship,
or indeed other extraordinary performance. The persisting problem is that the military, the U.S. Army in
particular, has failed to heed well what it teaches itself
in its institutions of higher military education about
the virtues of strategy. When strategy is neglected or
impossible, tactics and operations are not connected to
what ought to be understood as their purpose. Ulysses
Grant understood this basic point in 1864; it was the
most effective reason why the Civil War ended how
and when it did. Grant fought purposefully; unfortunately, U.S. military action for several decades has not
been close to being so well-led.14
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A FAMILIAR PAST? PARALLELS AND
ANALOGIES
Erroneous analogy is one of many blights to which
users of English may fall victim.15 At its best, analogy
aids understanding by means of the simple linguistic
trick of changing one topic in debate from a subject on
which you are not well versed, to one for which you
are much better prepared. The explicit or implicit similarity in some potentially significant degree between
the two cases legitimizes the introduction of analogy.
The use and frequent abuse of analogy is commonplace in public political life. After all, there is little that
is authentically novel in our politics. Times and their
particular issues certainly alter, but all human emotions and the pertinent moral, immoral, and amoral
urges that move people to and away from particular
behaviors persist. They do not seem to have changed
much for centuries, probably millennia. Love and
hatred, loyalty and treachery, honesty and dishonesty,
design and accident and so forth, are prominent in the
list of large binaries. These pairings comprise a formidable short list of the values and sentiments that we
believe demarcate us from the rest of the animal world.
One can contrast the idea of the historical parallel with that of the historical analogy. Readers are
advised, perhaps alerted, and warned that this author
is not in favor of the use of what are claimed to be historical analogies. In many years of scholarship, I have
found the idea of the historical parallel far more useful.
The two standards under discussion here, analogy and
parallel, are closely related, but there is a critically
individualizing distinction that renders the concept
of a parallel far safer to use than that of analogy. Specifically, the concept of a parallel is much looser than
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is that of analogy. Although both ideas claim to rest
upon notable similarities between subjects, the claim
on behalf of alleged parallelism is considerably weaker
than is that required to support a credible claim for
analogy. This is not to suggest formally that proof of
common identity is required on behalf of the argument favoring analogy. When historians make claims
to understand similar seeming societies, they should
appreciate that the evidence advanced is likely to be
regarded with heavy suspicion. It may be vulnerable
even to evidence of single-point nonconformity. It is
commonplace for authors who want to argue boldly
on the authority of asserted analogy; really, they mean
to claim only that most or many, rather than strictly all
cases are what they have in mind.
For the same reason that most, if not quite all,
claims for paradox should be more accurately understood as ones for irony, so nearly all claims for the
virtue in analogy would be composed more accurately
were they confined to arguments on behalf of parallelism. The idea of the historical parallel captures the
principal aspect of the idea of analogy, while avoiding the need for strict similarity or even identity. A
leading reason why the assertions of analogy should
be resisted is that its claims are—and indeed should
be—assumed to cover cases that really are like-forlike. The trouble with this rigorous, but fair requirement to demand of claims for historical analogy, is that
it is incompatible with the rich variety of human life
and experience. Of course, there are significant seeming similarities between individuals, institutions, and
experiences, including many that are centuries, even
millennia, apart. However, possibly without exception, the individual historical context will prove on
close examination to contain particular individual

16

human, societal-cultural, and institutional detail that
is sufficiently unique for us to be uneasy as scholars,
should we seek to homogenize disparate people and
their circumstances too rigorously.
An advantage of parallels over analogies is that
the former require only the plausible evidence of there
being strong similarities between the cases in point;
historical exactitude is not required. Since everyone
understands that no two historical events can ever truly
be exactly the same, the purveyor of historical explanation who claims support from their apparent similarities should have, by far, the easier job in persuasion. It
is one thing to argue for there being apparently more
or less similarity between or among historical events,
it is quite another to claim that two or more sequences
of events are all but identical in key features (e.g., plot,
victims, aggressors, strategy, tactics, and weapons).
Experience and some reflection tell us that claims for
strict analogy are rarely appropriate or necessary. The
difficult challenge in claiming a precisely common
identity between events is so heavy that the temptation
and the endeavor are usually best resisted.
An advantage in the use of alleged historical parallels is that if they are employed only occasionally
and carefully as to evidence developed in their support, they can prove seriously persuasive. Because the
claims for discovery of similarity are so much weaker
for the parallel than the allegedly analogous, they are
much easier to meet; also, of course, they are near certain not to cover detail that may be vital to the purpose
of the argument. The 20th century was richly populated
with sequences of like events that had great potential
to mislead those most responsible for peace and war
in Europe and Asia. Expert familiarity with diplomatic
maneuvering in international politics has some ability
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to mislead the supposedly proficient manipulators
for advantage and disadvantage. However, there are
limitations even upon the scope of detail guessable by
statesmen. What is usually quite beyond the capability of discovery are the possibly vital details of choice
that stem from individual personalities and the stimuli
they find in a particular context.
Although historical analogies frequently carry
an irresistible appeal, readers need to be warned
that there are serious perils in analogy. Because they
depend upon the plausibility of alleged likeness across
many centuries in time and continents in geography,
there is often pressure on the author to be generous in
his or her interpretation of the events at issue. When
an author sets out to write his interpretation of events
and their probable meaning over time, it is not to the
advantage of the reader for him to act as an advocate
on possibly live matters for political argument. Illustration of argument by means of claimed analogy or
parallelism can be an effective way to reach an audience who would rather be following their favorite soap
operas. It is prudent, however, to remember that the
same standard of accuracy does not hold for popular
television programs as for scholarly monographs. The
main story line and supporting evidence may well be
much lighter in the former case, but a historical narrative should not be permitted to tell, or even imply seriously, that events were other than they were known
to be, even in popular entertainment. The full story, or
some approximation to the truth, may well need to be
simplified, but it should not be rewritten for a better
cultural fit with the preferences or prejudices of the
audience.16
The phenomena of claimed historical parallels and
analogies are especially at a severe risk of (political)
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misuse. It is in the nature of these linguistic phenomena
to attempt to score political points by being economical with the truth. The reason for using these tricks
of speech is to enable the speaker or reader to reach
an audience emotionally and typically only to suggest
some association between the object of the exercise and
potential critics. A few signature jokes may enable a
controversial speaker to avoid explaining himself to an
audience. Argument by analogy or historical parallel is
as unavoidable in a democracy as sometimes it can be
extraordinarily effective.
The late and great Harvard professor Samul P.
Huntington argued that the United States should
behave in a manner that fits its size and importance in
the world. He suggested that the country, being extraordinarily large and powerful, should conduct itself in a
manner that reflects its potent size and character.
My basic message is that American strategy and the
process by which it is made must reflect the nature of
American society. Earlier I criticized those who urged us
to adopt a strategy that was at variance with the inherent
character of American society.17

This could mean that U.S. policy and strategy
would tend not so much to rely upon extraordinary
skill and finesse, but rather upon superior quantities
of material. Huntington did have an important major
point to impart. Specifically, a distinguishing feature of
the United States is its size and potential as well as its
realized strength. This size, and the diversity within it,
is a source of some limitations. For example, the country has developed and constructed what is probably
the world’s finest nuclear arsenal and set of complementary delivery systems. However, this impressive
deployment carries the highly unusual caveat that
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nuclear weapons only have a deterrent function. That
characterization is not completely accurate, but it is
true enough to cover all cases except any that involve
either nuclear threats or which menace vital American (including many Allied) interests. While there has
been a constant nuclear military backstop to American statecraft for nearly 70 years, a history of the contribution of nuclear armament to global security and
stability will need to look hard to find apparent evidence of the nuclear contribution. This lack of nuclear
prominence in our conduct of relations that bear the
balance of power may continue indefinitely. Long may
it remain so! However, there is an uncertainty about
nuclear weapons that should stimulate some modest
anxiety. Successful deterrence leaves scant evidence.
Specifically, neither analogy nor parallel offers a
helpful way into understanding the perils of a world
in which the stability of the global political system
depends upon the prudence that should be one of, or
possibly the only, guiding quality of statesmen. I am
uneasy giving voice to so extreme sounding a point of
view, but there is no avoiding the necessity for it in
this monograph. There is no historical precedent for a
nuclear war. Individual cities have been wiped off the
face of the Earth, but a catastrophe without identifiably predictable limits in its destructiveness and longer-term widespread lethal consequences is not a part
of human history. Now, this is a possibility. Historical
research should be able to help us order our thoughts,
including priorities. However, the 72 years since Hiroshima have yielded no obvious source of a nuclear
negation that appears to enjoy an extraordinarily high
promise of success.
What should the U.S. military learn from the last
7 decades of history about the country’s national
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security? If the first, and potentially overriding, rule in
statecraft is prudence, it must follow unavoidably that
what the United States has to avoid, almost at all costs,
must be any variant of nuclear adventurism. A trouble
is that it is the very awesomeness and sheer terror of
nuclear war that carries the most telling punch in statecraft.18 The more acute of the superpower international
crises in the era of stable balance, since the mid-1950s,
have not yielded a particularly rich haul of nuclear
relevant details. Two episodes in particular carried
serious danger: Cuba in October 1963 and, for reason
of an intelligence failure, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in November 1983.19 The Cuban Missile
Crisis soon became famous for common sense, while
the Soviet crisis 2 decades later passed undetected in
the United States at the time. It is likely that very occasional brief periods of acute technical and operational
anxiety have troubled both superpowers. The problem
is that we do not know. Because of our ignorance, we
have not been able to step back safely from a condition
of mutual nuclear deterrence, in order to study recent
nuclear near-events calmly. What we think we know
is that there is no way in which we could withdraw
from our nuclear relationship with Russia. Because of
geography and politics, the United States could not
prudently leave its NATO commitments. Since there
appears to be no technological answer to the threat of
nuclear weapons, we are obliged to pursue national
security by the political and psychological routes.
The experience of mutual nuclear deterrence can
rest for our analysis and understanding only upon the
evidence from 60 years or less, which is a distressingly
brief period to employ as the basis for the theory and
practice of global security. Those of us who have ventured into the locker room of nuclear practice and theory
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have been periodically worried, perhaps alarmed, by a
better appreciation of the awesomely dreadful possibilities. An error in policy, strategy, or tactics by either
of the primary protagonists, acting independently or
interactively in combination, could have unwelcome
consequences almost too grim to consider.
It is extremely difficult to know how best we should
prepare for a politically triggered nuclear event that
would be far beyond all human experience to date. On
war itself, in general, we should feel abundantly well
informed, if not misinformed; but bilateral nuclear war
of any dimension is completely beyond human experience. The study of history is useful, indeed essential, but when there is no useful data of note, we are
compelled to attempt to swim in the dark. It would be
somewhat reassuring were we likely to be capable of
improving on our performance as a nuclear warfare
participant by a consequence of our learning from
experience what appears to be successful, politically
and strategically, and what does not. However, for
better or worse, and unfortunately almost certainly the
latter, it appears unlikely that the U.S. Army would
be seriously interested in the later phases of a nuclear
war, so horrible would any early round almost certainly prove to be. There is an excellent reason why
the Army should understand what it can about nuclear
warfare, but this is one of those fortunately very rare
subjects that does not clarify usably as a consequence
of more intense study. There are subjects that appear
reluctant to surrender secrets even to the careful military scholar. Possibly, it is fortunate that nuclear conflict with an opponent armed in a manner similar to
the United States is not a topic that has attracted much
attention of recent years. Probably it is true to claim
that an important reason why nuclear warfighting
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does not attract professional attention more heavily
is because of the principles of national security that
insist upon the primacy of politics over strategy, and
of strategy over tactics. The actual conduct of nuclear
warfare would most likely be a near wholly political,
and not seriously a military-strategic, exercise. Even if
this thought and logic is found less than fully persuasive, in prospect it certainly should have the effect of
discouraging strategic imagination.
It is well worth my mentioning as a near certain
likelihood the extreme difficulty that would impede
analytical or theoretical effort to make strategic sense
of nuclear warfare. This is one of those rare cases of an
obvious need for strategy where it would not be likely
to meet with a strategically sensible response; it would
be terra incognita for the U.S. Government and Army.
Of course, the preferred answer to the scenario just
mentioned has to be a continuation without discernible end of the now longstanding condition of mutual
nuclear deterrence. However, a problem with this condition is that it may be vulnerable even to a single failure in the pertinent human, mechanical, and electronic
details. In short, our current system of mutual nuclear
deterrence could fail catastrophically because of only a
very limited breakdown in the supporting human, or
the mechanical and electronic systems. The robustness
of mutual deterrence should not be doubted. However, the scale of the potential catastrophe is so great
that it is only responsible of us to work for a political
and military system of international security that has
more safety catches than at present.
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WHAT CHANGES AND WHAT DOES NOT?
There is a fundamental question lying behind this
monograph with which not all of us agree. This is yet
another example of the possible potency of assumptions. It is not self-evident that we understand much
about military matters that were unknown to Greeks
and Romans. Of course, a myriad of detail distinguishes now from then, but it is not obvious that much
of deep significance has changed. It is entirely possible
that the fundamental premise upon which this monograph is built is unsound. It is possible, and might
just be probable, that there is little, if anything, to be
learned from the past—distant or near—because we
humans are not obviously a species capable of learning
from past mistakes.
Many people, perhaps most, seem to believe that
change, great and small, is desirable. Often unfortunately, it is welcomed seemingly for its own sake.
Because it has become central to the economy of our
way of life, the notion of constant change has been
allowed to take unsound root. Change, however, is
not in itself either prudent or foolish; rather, it must
depend on the context. The Armed Forces can appear
to believe that a perfectibility of arms is possible. This
may be a healthy attitude, even if it always proves to
be an ambitious desire too far to reach. The sad truth
is that an international arms competition needs to be
regarded as a permanent feature of global life, since it
can be arrested only by the political force responsible
for its creation and growth. So noisy is the clamor from
commercial interests and the regular episodic political extravaganzas by means of which we elect political leaders, that it is scarcely surprising to find scant
appreciation of our contemporary dependence upon
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past wisdom and sound practice. A vitally important
reason we are able to cast our minds back in confident expectation of discovering examples of prudent
behavior, is because quite often we have knowledge
of probable historical consequences. When seeking
some possible education for the future from the past,
we need never to forget that our contemporary ignorance of future consequences has to be regarded as a
permanent limitation of any study of the future. The
future cannot be studied, in terms either of the largely
known past, or of anything else. Zero data is an uncorrectable problem. Zero is still zero, no matter how
ingenious social scientific analysis may appear to be.
This is disappointing and possibly even discouraging
to over-ambitious scientists, but there it is. However,
for a notable source of possible assistance, there is the
subject of this monograph. It is necessary to be basic,
even humble, and enquire of our scholars what they
think they know about the future that could be really
useful.
Those scholars need to accept an elementary triadic
categorization of events of all kinds.
First, there is the past, sometimes as processed
selectively by scholars whom we call historians. As the
past fades into, and then beyond memory, it is greatly
honored with the title of history.20
Second, there is the recent passage of time and its
abundance of what is known as current affairs. As time
passes, first-hand, living knowledge literally expires
physically.
Third, there is what commonly is called history.
This enormous potential source of knowledge stretches
from the outer limit of widespread public first-hand
experience and knowledge, all the way back as far as
we can reach with our largely archeological findings.

25

There is certain to be considerable disdain toward
troops who proved able to display examples of behavior
incompatible with the requirements of a combat ready
organization. The U.S. Army, like all others, discovered
ancient truths about its soldiers in North Africa and
Italy in 1942-43. When the U.S. Army met the German
Army in the Mediterranean theater in 1943, the results
generally were not flattering to American military
self-esteem. The military disadvantage in the comparison made here extended to the very topmost level of
command. The overall U.S. military commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, had no first-hand combat
experience and had never commanded troops in battle
prior to his experience in North Africa. Given that his
adversaries were German military stars, Albert Kesselring and Erwin Rommel, this imbalance in the quality
of leadership was much to the Allied disadvantage.
American soldiers needed to learn how to survive and
win in combat; being American conveyed no special
immunity to harm. In war after war, American soldiers have had to learn to give the enemy of the day
the respect they often deserved.21
It can be difficult for American soldiers to come
to terms with an enemy who needs to be treated with
respect, but not by a disabling anxiety or even fear.
While American soldiers have been fortunate not to
have been compelled by national policy choice to face
a truly first-class enemy in the earliest phases of what
would become World Wars, it did mean that when the
United States eventually became committed to battle it
was initially at a severe disadvantage owing to its relative inexperience. American soldiers in 1942 meeting
their German adversaries had last met this enemy in
the fall of 1918. In addition, the Japanese foe encountered on the Solomon Island of Guadalcanal in 1942
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had been fighting already for many preceding years.
Moving forward in time, the Viet Cong and North
Vietnamese soldiers had many years’ experience of
battle, before the U.S. Army entered South Vietnam in
large numbers in 1965.
There is an assertion of historical change that is no
better than a plausible fallacy. Change in conditions,
tools, and beliefs have been a fact beyond doubt. That
fact, however, cannot just be assumed to have great
significance. It does not usually require much historical scholarship to enable us to appreciate the difference
between major and minor causes of change. Furthermore, the number of the latter is easy to exaggerate.
While cultural, including moral, change is relatively
rare and indeed tends to be negated and reversed as
a consequence of its negative results, material change
can be rapid and difficult to assimilate and, if necessary, adopt. Ideational change typically is more of a
challenge to master and overcome than is material
change. Whereas material discovery, technological
innovation, and novel practices can be routinized by
a scientifically advanced society, cultural change at
the level of revolution tends to be far more difficult for
people to comprehend and then practice.
Soldiers in the U.S. Army reading this monograph
may notice that the nonmaterial difference between
today and ancient times are easily exaggerated. The
essence of strategy applied as directly and consequentially for Greeks, Romans, and Persians, as it does for
us today and, we can predict confidently, will do so
tomorrow. The unforgiving core logic of strategy has
not altered over time. Indeed, changes in weaponry
and logistical provision scarcely signify for mention
when they are contrasted with the major causes of
strategic strife that have scarcely changed at all over
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millennia. The risks and rewards in soldiers’ lives
assuredly have been cumulatively altered quite a bit
over the centuries, but the enduring and fundamental
logic of strategy always applies, notwithstanding the
wide range in the detail of historical variation.
For conceptual clarification, sound understanding of military behavior in any period should flow
from a view of history in terms of the relations among
just four master concepts—ends, ways, means, and
assumptions. Historical actors in any and every period
have been obliged by contextual necessity to endeavor
to cope with the relations among the imperative logic
of these four key ideas. The four concepts are strictly
architectural in their logic; they can explain historical failure as well as success. The great changes that
undoubtedly have occurred emphatically have not
weakened the basic logical sense in the necessary
cooperative connections that should unify ends, ways,
means, and assumptions.
The principal benefit of the formula of ends, ways,
means, and assumptions naturally does not lie in any
particular mastery of historical narrative. Instead, it
equips the soldier as a warrior scholar, or simply as an
interested general reader, adequately for understanding how and why military power can, and perhaps
should, work.22 Whoever the enemy, whatever the
terrain, and regardless of the detail of political intention, there is need for: clarity in political purpose; a
requirement for sufficiently effective ways to threaten
and apply force; and a need to be matched by adequate
means to achieve the necessary application.
For the purpose of this monograph, it is necessary
for the reader to accept as a possible, I believe certain,
fact a quite startling contrast. On the one hand, a world
expressing and reflecting minor and major change in
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many features and circumstances. On the other hand,
in contrast, there is the plain evidence of a near steady
state in the values that have much deeper meaning and
reflect lasting worth. Unsurprisingly, the more senior
the level of command, the more readily comparable
have been the possible and probable lessons of history. It would be more accurate to follow Sir Michael
Howard when he draws a distinction between history
simply as the past, and history meaning the past as
massaged and interpreted by historians.23
Looking back, even over a very long time, some
immediate tentative conclusions press for consideration. For example, if we consider Roman military
experience we discover that the experience at different
ranks of contrasting responsibilities bear strong similarities between then and now. At the topmost level,
the tools employed have changed hugely, indeed
beyond recognition, but the challenges have not
altered greatly. The general officer still acts on behalf
of the state, and is held responsible if policy is shown
by field experience not to have been chosen wisely. In
addition, the military leader will find today that he
needs to be able to lead as well as command, and that
not all of his most senior subordinate officers are fully
competent. In some cases, this will pose a serious difficulty when the senior commanders in question have
politically heavy hitting potential support. This difficult case arises when at (our) home or when they are
appointed to satisfy strong domestic interests or meet
a strong foreign interest.
Of course, the soldiers willing to learn from their
country’s history may discover that there is, or could
be, a path to political authority, paved by the natural
popularity of military success. Whether fully merited or not, truly outstanding military leaders in the
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United States do have a history of post-war democratic
political success. George Washington, Zachary Taylor,
Ulysses S. Grant, Dwight Eisenhower, and even possibly David Petraeus spring to mind as the outstanding exemplars of this phenomenon, even though a
yearning for political power was not a life-long defining characteristic of all of them. What is required here
above all else is education in the theory and practice of
connections among the increasingly elevated levels of
conflict. Soldiers need to understand, even if occasionally only resentfully, that all of the combat in warfare,
and all the logistical effort involved, can only be justified in terms of its net achievement. It can have no
justification, even meaning, if it is not firmly connected
to higher purposes. Whenever and wherever one looks
in historical records, all military activity, in times of
peace or of war, has to serve a purpose of a nature
different from its own. The American military person
should realize that he or she represents but the latest
human example of a great historical truth. Specifically,
military power of all kinds has some political meaning. That is not a matter for policy choice. The military
institution is, and has to be, about politics, even though
it is not itself political in its nature.
Some historical perspective frequently is asked and
even expected of our political leaders, though often,
indeed usually, people forget about the genuine limitations on our knowledge. Recognition of such limitations should be an important step on the path of
improvement in historical utility. For example, there
is no way in which either acute crisis or the outbreak
of war can be predicted by the harder or the softer sciences. There is no miracle formula that can unravel the
relevant mysteries of the future. However, careful analysis of past crises and political-military competitions
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enable us to identify conditions of unusual peril.
Because of our eternal ignorance of what will happen
later today, let alone tomorrow and thereafter, we
need strictly to follow a rule of prudence in international security affairs. Knowledge of the past cannot
serve a reliable predictive purpose, but it should alert
us to understanding what can happen. Since we must
assume that there is great continuity in human history, we are obliged to assume that what has occurred
may be repeated, albeit in rather more modern forms.
Bearing in mind the awesome dangers of nuclear holocaust, and the grossly incomplete success achieved to
date with regard to the alleviation of interstate armed
conflict, it is only prudent for us to seek such assistance
as may be sought from history.
WHAT CAN THE U.S. ARMY LEARN FROM
HISTORY?
An attempt such as this, to identify ideas and
behavior from history may be, certainly may appear
to be, wildly overambitious. I have chosen to identify
and explain just eight conclusions that I have reached
as a consequence of my more than 50 years of scholarship, much of it on matters that bear closely upon
the national security of the United States. The question
in the title to the topic of this monograph could prove
impracticably large, almost beyond discipline. As a
consequence of the boundary resistant concept of history I have been obliged to exercise ruthless judgment
with respect to inclusion and exclusion of subjects.
What follows is a relatively brief discussion of a modest
number of answers to the large question set by the U.S.
Army War College (USAWC) and the Strategic Studies
Institute (SSI). I have decided not to attempt to provide
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a descending order of relative significance, because an
effort to do this could mislead the reader by encouraging him or her to think in terms of fairly orderly
categories. However, the past, present, and future is
not like that. Events of all kinds often just occur when
they do. Real life in all ages often surprises participants; the past truly is disorderly, despite the energetic
efforts of some people and institutions, everywhere
and always, to plan and enable orderly and purposeful progress. When we are advised to try to make sense
of history, what is meant is the sense already discovered. My argument is that even the most planned and
controlled of human endeavors will have a tendency,
assuredly a potential, to go off the rails and descend
into a variant of chaos. I am not talking mainly about
willful mischief, but rather about our human capability to make mistakes, become confused, or simply be
individualistic in a world that has expectations and a
requirement for us to obey rules that are orders. Military institutions, in particular, understand well and
appropriately that they live and perform almost literally on the edge of chaos. The history of all countries,
especially when they engage in armed conflict—in any
period in the past—usually is a story both of struggle
against an identified enemy, but also against error and
confusion in their own ranks. This tendency toward,
indeed some need to tolerate, disorder was almost a
quality required of the U.S. Army in the 20th century,
as twice it needed to grow exponentially in order to
do battle with first Imperial, then Nazi, Germany. On
both occasions, in 1917-18 and 1942-43, the U.S. Army
had the best of reasons to be grateful that Allied armies
already, if ironically, had been well trained by their
common German enemy.
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The analysis and choice of evidence employed
in this section of this monograph has been carefully
selected to minimize the possibility of bias in the
text. The frequency with which British and American
cases are cited reflects nothing more sinister than the
author’s professional foci over half a century of study.
It is worth mentioning that I believe nearly all the arguments and major points registered in the following section are quite general truths that apply to the national
security systems of many countries.
1. Interpreting the Past, a Basic Question of Context
and Authority
The past is owned by nobody; history, in sharpest contrast, bears many claims to ownership. These
claims appear mainly in the writings of professional
historians; these scholars may tell the truth about the
past that they know. However, that truth is certain to
depend upon a limited and particular empirical base
of evidence and also upon the authors’ preferences
that reflect various motivations. The historian writing
history is not a scholar faithfully transcribing words
that bear a divine authority. Instead, they reflect a
selection of knowledge the historian has allowed himself to see and consider, as well as the facts to which
he, or she, did not have reliable access. Truth about the
past may have rotted away in the course of time, been
heedlessly damaged or destroyed, or hidden by accident or design by people many years ago. All works
of what commonly is called history lack authority to
a greater or lesser degree. Unavoidably, they will not
and cannot know the truth as it was understood in the
past by historical figures. This is not to criticize historians; their problem, as well as possible advantage,
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is one of perspective and that derives critically from
particular context.
As Professor Sir Michael Howard argued:
history, whatever its value in educating the judgement,
teaches no ‘lessons,’ and the professional historians
will be as skeptical of those who claim that it does as
professional doctors are of their colleagues who peddle
medicines guaranteeing instant cures.24

A universal fact so obvious that it usually escapes
notice and attention is in need of recognition. Everyone, in all periods, enjoys or endures what is known
as context. This potent concept captures in meaning all
that is known and understood by a person including
those forces and influences that shape circumstances,
whether or not they are recognized at the time. Context
shares much in common with the idea of assumptions.
Both concepts are incredibly powerful, yet attract little
explicit scholarly or popular attention. The concepts of
context and assumptions are of great significance for
this study, because in mutually dependent ways they
both have profound meaning for many, indeed most,
claims concerning the motives of historical actors.
Many of life’s decisions rest upon assumptions that
we do not feel any need to challenge, sometimes even
when we would be at liberty to do so.
It would be a non-trivial challenge to ask of an
American soldier today that he or she should attempt
to think as soldiers in times possibly long past. Probably it would be a greater challenge to ask of American
soldiers that they ought to try to recognize and learn
from the experience of other soldiers, possibly foreign
and long dead. No matter how surprising it may be to
many of today’s soldiers, relatively little about military
planning, combat itself, logistics, and communications
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is a revelation revealed only by the awesomely awful
global military history of the past century. Nonetheless, of course the tactical and technical details of
change matter profoundly at the sharpest end of military life and sometimes death. However, much of what
has been, and remains, of great strategic significance
has scarcely altered at all in its essentials over the centuries. This is an important reason why we can still
read Greek and Roman authors with sympathy and
even gratitude.
2. The Human Race Has Not Learned Sufficiently
from Its History—Yet!
It is both a prudent and a sad truth about this
assertion that it does not inspire any particular kind of
behavior by the military student. A trouble with history, in the sense of an ever-arguable narrative, is that
it is prudently safe because by definition it is about the
past. This is neither to forget nor deny that the past
already may have been mortgaged for the future. However, its substance, even if seriously regretted by some
today, is done and gone for better or worse. However,
since past behavior cannot be recalled and returned in
hope of our achieving an improved outcome, we are
obliged by the laws of physics only to perform a single
journey into the future. Therefore, acting as two complementary inhibitors, knowledge and understanding
of the future is hampered severely by an inability to
predict the future reliably in detail. Certainly, we are
able to, and do, predict; but ambitious predictions are
hardly ever beyond risk of serious error. Leaving aside
the large issue of the readiness of historical knowledge
for useful raiding by scholars in need of assistance,
there is usually considerable room for disagreement
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over the wisdom of important choices in the past. It is
one thing to assert that a particular choice in our history had researchable, identifiable consequences; it is
quite another to argue there were some unwelcome
alternatives that were not tried.
The second point about learning from history tends
not to be made by cameras with a width of lens at all
suitable to the subject. “The paths not taken” is likely
to provide material for extensive study. This logic
inclines us to be more tolerant of theoretical alternative courses of action than soldiers often are able to
be, prudently. When a decision for action or inaction
is needed this day, possibly this hour or even this
minute, understanding possible alternatives is more
likely to paralyze than to assist. Moving up the ladder
of likely consequences, from tactical through operational, to strategic and eventually political choice,
many strategic decisions have literally unknowable
and certainly unpredictable results. In addition, just
as few, if any, major strategic decisions will be free of
greater or lesser risk, so ambitious governments must
be able to tolerate bad military and political news.
All countries “cherry pick” particular items from
the whole library of preferred national history. Everyone—all cultures—can find examples of national heroism against the odds. All countries have a tale or two
of struggles against adversity; for example, defeat that
is really a moral victory, as with the Alamo in 1836, or
Wake Island, and Bataan in 1942. There has been ample
genuine heroism in the global human story. There is
no need to mention the fact that grim tales of extraordinary military effort for survival exist in all countries’
histories, legends, and mythologies. History textbooks
are not weighed around the world in order to ascertain
the probable truth they seek to convey to the young.
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Anyway, who or which institution could be trusted to
tell the truth, if—that is—the truth is a valid ambition.
All countries have a vested interest in telling their history largely from the biased perspective of themselves.
The historical education of the young everywhere is,
in varying degree, tribal. This is readily understandable and indeed inevitable and unavoidable, though it
is hardly praiseworthy.
3. Bad Times Always Return
History does not repeat itself, but one cannot avoid
noticing that there would appear to be a repetitive, if
somewhat irregular, pattern to conditions of peace and
war. Especially noticeable is the repetition of threat on
a major scale to the integrity of the United States for
much of the country’s relatively brief existence. Eras
of peace and tranquility have not often been the lot of
Americans; whether our security concerns were more
or less confined to North America, which was the case
in the 18th and 19th centuries. Addressing problems
of national security in a global context, the American
experience since 1900 has been exciting and dangerous.
A condition literally of extreme peril has now become
the situation normal for Americans in an era of nuclear
weapons. This reality of life in the shadow of nuclear
danger, seemingly, has all but lost the power to shock,
so habituated are we to the danger.
A careful reading of history leads unavoidably to
the conclusion that bad times always return. This is a
fact based on ample evidence from all periods in the
past of our species. The soldier reading works of history will be at risk of misunderstanding much that is
controversial, even essentially unknowable with total
confidence, but that should not much matter. What
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should matter for the soldier is to appreciate those
conditions of instability and insecurity most likely to
continue long into the future. There has been no philosophy, religion, or political ideology proved able
to unite all of mankind. It has not happened, period!
Given what we think we know and understand about
past millennia, alas, it is a completely safe bet that the
human race will not improve. All we can do is be vigilant on our watch.
4. In the Hierarchy of Professional Concern to
Soldiers, Policy and its Politics are More Important
than Strategy, Operations, and Tactics
As a student of strategy for more than 50 years,
I find this rather a challenge to write. It should be a
standard truth that professional soldiers do not question legitimate orders issued by their political superiors that were transmitted through the proper chain of
command. That said, it is plausible to argue that inappropriate political choices are the principal culprits in
many cases. Sometimes, fortunately rarely, there is a
cause for war so serious that the country has little discretion in its choice of response, or even initiative. Most
polities occasionally confront the necessity for making
an unwelcome choice. It is important to remember that
even a country as uniquely powerful as the United
States can find itself in a strategic and therefore also
a political situation that appears to admit of no alternative answers to the politically existential question
posed: Do we fight? This was the grim prospect in
South Korea in June 1950, while much more arguably
it had been the case also in 1917 and 1940-41.
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The argument of greatest relative significance here
is that political choices typically, even many untypically, can have a weight in consequences that more
narrow ones cannot reach. Though often only with
much embarrassment, and certainly a great deal of
pain, there are no decisions at the rare level of national
policy, with its politics, that could not change sharply
the course taken by the nation. The simple seeming
staff college model of ends, ways, and means (with
appropriate assumptions), really in its profound
meaning says it all! The political goals that are policy
ends, the strategic ways to achieve them, and the various (including military) means to behave as may be
required should not confuse the student. The military
institutions of the state ought to be able to advise and,
if necessary, warn political authorities about the likely
consequences of their policy choices. However, it is
only exceptional for a major political choice leading to
large-scale warfare to be challenged, even retroactively
in such popular democracies as the United States and
the United Kingdom. The British Chilcot Enquiry into
the Iraq War, which took 8 years to conduct and complete, was a notable exception to the usual rule that
efforts are not made to seek out and apportion responsibility, and therefore blame, for policy choices that
subsequent developments show to have been a mistake. By far the most important conclusion we should
draw from the enquiry led by Lord Chilcot was about
the significance of political choice, not so much about
British military competence in Iraq, which undoubtedly was less than stellar. Soldiers may well make the
best of a job that ought to have been deemed too difficult for them to attempt. High tactical and even operational competence will not suffice to compensate for
fatally poor political choices in policy. Even excellence
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in policy offers no guarantee of advantage; it cannot
compensate adequately for basic errors in policy choice.
There may be local and temporary benefit to be gained
through tactical and even operational superiority, but
that is unlikely to lead to an enduring advantage; for
that to be the case one must look to politics.
5. Predictions and Assumptions About War Should
Never Be Trusted Uncritically
By definition, predictions and assumptions are
made even though there is a lack of empirical evidence in their support. Because of our incapability
to see over the time horizon to the future, we need to
make many decisions that can rest only on preparation, not real-time experience. The individual soldier
knows how high the personal risk can be in warfare,
but he or she does not know, and fortunately cannot
predict, how severe the danger will prove to be. What
the soldier will not know is how great a strategic, and
therefore political, risk the country is taking in a decision for war. What the soldier, conscript, or volunteer
is unlikely to know, or possibly even understand, is
the abundantly evidenced worldwide truth that war is
always a gamble. So many and intense are the calculations and emotions that go into a war that a really confident prediction about results, let alone consequences,
should always be treated with suspicion. The course
and outcome of war often turn out to be surprising to
the belligerents. Actions for and within war assuredly
can be planned and much should be predictable, but
the live, real-time dynamics of warfare invariably are a
mystery ahead of time. The fundamental reason for this
is the existence of a self-willed enemy. Neat and effective plans that largely ignore the will and capability
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of the enemy are dangerous. Strategic intentions that
simply assume away any inconvenient competence
on the part of the enemy are all too familiar. We can
recall the French folly concerning the assumption that
the Viet-Minh would lack the ability to mount a serious artillery threat to the garrison of Dien Bien Phu
in 1954.25 A decade earlier, there was the convenient
assumption by General Mark Clark that German General Albert Kesselring’s Luftwaffe posed no serious
threat from the air to the Allied amphibious operation
at Salerno south of Rome.26 We do not want to discourage American soldiers from taking risks, but we need
to teach or remind them that decisions for war, great
or small, are always a gamble; they will be a move
beyond empirical evidence.
6. Of Course Battles Matter, but Typically Wars are
Won or Lost Strategically and Politically
Single, allegedly decisive battles are a rarity in
the entire narrative of history.27 They do occur, but
it is more common for a great clash of arms in battle
to be only a bloody episode in the entire narrative of
a conflict. Popular fiction and movies thrive on little
nourishment from a fairly thin list of battles that were
probably more terrifying events for the participants
than they were strategically meaningful. Readers
may recall that this monograph insisted much earlier
that strategy essentially is about the consequences of
action. In modern times—say since the founding of
the American Republic in 1776—it has been rare for
a belligerent to roll the dice in battle in a decisively
concluding move. The reasons are not hard to identify;
two such are technology and ideology. The range and
therefore reach of national military power, thinking
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of air, missile, and also of nuclear weapons, has rendered war a potentially history-ending experience.
This menace poses insoluble difficulties for states. It is
quite a challenge to be in a condition of war-readiness,
indeed of an approximate hair-trigger alertness for a
long period, when the war we threaten to inflict would
not be survivable. This last claim may not be reliably
true. Obviously, evidence is missing, but we would be
suitably prudent to assume it is true. If we seek strategic advantage for political gain, as probably we should
very rarely, there can be no forgetting the nuclear peril
that could conclude the American experience.
7. History is not a Morality Tale
Many factors enhance the prospect of national
success, but a moral advantage is not credibly among
them. When a government or political elite commits
crimes against all of humanity today, it may pay a
heavy price in terms of political support denied. A
modern electorate will be capable of punishing unsuccessful candidates by excluding them from positions
of political power. The moral audit of thought and
behavior typically does not carry sanctions more painful than exclusion from high office. However, soldiers
seeking to learn from history will discover that democracy with a universal adult franchise has not been the
norm in the past. They learn also that in most countries
for long periods it was physically dangerous to lead
politically. In particular periods, the 3rd century A.D.
for example, it was unusual for a Roman emperor to
die peacefully.
A concept as non-specific as the past plainly can
accommodate virtually every claimed exception to
whatever otherwise is claimed to have been a familiar
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informal rule governing human political and moral
behavior and misbehavior. Governments do not like
to be caught out by journalists, let alone by a court of
international law, for having committed undoubtable
wrongdoing when they are ethically regarded. However, even less do they favor an undeniable failure of
policy. A problem is that the standard of right (enough)
conduct has varied over the centuries, as has the freedom of action of political leaders. There is little room
for doubt that the difference between success and failure is as clear today as it was in antiquity. The actual
content of the two contrasting ideas has varied richly
over time and in different circumstances, but still the
two usually are distinguishable.
It is plausible to claim that right conduct by contemporary standards has hardly ever been allowed a
dominant role in political decision-making. Nonetheless, few political leaders have been genuinely and
repeatedly indifferent to moral condemnation. Readers
of history soon notice, however, that nearly all major
policy decisions in most countries in every period of
history have been both praised and condemned. Inevitably, this means that even when there appear to have
been plain cases of immoral behavior, there were,
almost certainly, some mighty arguments that could
be advanced in justification. Overall, one is obliged by
the empirical evidence to conclude that political leaders tend overwhelmingly to follow a pragmatic rule of
contemporary expediency.
8. Great Powers Can Make Great Mistakes
As in individual interpersonal relations, governments are capable of making mistakes. Obviously, the greater the state in question, the larger and
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consequentially more deleterious the mistakes in policy
choice are likely to be. The reason is that nearly all of
the larger choices in public policy could be argued in
different ways. Often it is quite a challenge for the historian to be sufficiently emotionally detached from the
historical circumstances under examination. They need
to retain the necessary distance for adequate objectivity. Historians often become surrogate participants in
policy controversies of the past, sometimes even the
long past. An obvious and unavoidable problem with
a historian as a kind of participant advocate for one
side or another is that they are both blessed and cursed
with possession of the priceless pearl of foreknowledge about yesterday’s future. While there can be high
value in determining the probable consequences of
actions taken at a certain date, it can be fiendishly difficult for us to avoid using our knowledge from the
future improperly.
The larger the country, the larger major errors
in policy are likely to be, and the deeper and longer
lasting the likely consequences of ill-chosen policy.
The three most recent examples of well-intentioned
American policy that deserved to succeed—Vietnam,
Afghanistan, and Iraq—unsurprisingly perhaps, generated warfare of a character that was locally all but
uniformly unfortunate. In all three historic cases just
cited, the fundamental problem for the United States
was of the same kind: weakness in the understanding of local politics and culture. From time to time, an
expeditionary intervention led by the United States
may be timely and advisable. However, such extreme
action should not be taken largely in the vague hope
that things will turn out acceptably. The United States
should only commit to military action when it understands what it is doing, why it is doing it, and how
policy objectives are to be secured. Some mistakes are
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inevitable, but many in the recent past were foreseeable, and therefore should have been avoidable.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY
1. Behave Prudently
Prudent behavior is that which is conducted with
careful regard for the future. Strategy is all about consequences. The past is already done and gone, poorly
or well and usually some of both. The constant need to
insist that soldiers today act with appreciation of the
high relevance of prudence in thought and action aims
at the very heart of strategy. Many people, including
scholars, need reminding that military action has no
positive value in and of itself. The very idea of consequences can often appear irrelevant, because the
challenge today is so demanding that military commanders find no time, or spare energy, to devote to
possible happenings in the future. It is understandable
if they feel so fully employed trying to meet current
demands that they lack the spare personal capacity
needed for worry about tomorrow. Of course, it is not
always obvious which is the most prudent course of
action to adopt, especially given that an undue determination to behave prudently risks having to meet
with the charge of being unduly cautious. That said,
as it needs to be, there is a general need for prudence,
meaning the holding to a serious concern about the
consequences of a chosen action.
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2. Remember the Concept of the Great Stream of
Time
It is healthy for personal humility, even if, indeed
perhaps particularly if, they are senior generals, not
to forget that they and their behavior has meaning
in, and consequences for, the great stream of time for
the human past, or history.28 There can be high utility in understanding clearly that there is little done
today that could not be repudiated, overturned, or
even reversed tomorrow. More than casual acknowledgement of that possible fact should encourage some
respect for the taking of a longer view of history than
otherwise might be the case. It is important, even critically so, not to forget that only a nuclear military event
offers the highly plausible prospect of, quite literally,
an end to history of any interest to us today. Almost
anything and everything else can be accommodated
for consequential historical meaning. The concept of
the great stream of time has room for both good and
bad news. It has been said many times that there is a
great deal of ruin in a nation; meaning in this instance
that the United States has a national government that
makes both good and less good decisions. Although
a particular national administration will make regrettable decisions that have unfortunate consequences
that were not foreseen, presidencies come and go on
the 4-year cycle. At least, happily, this is the American
way in politics and governance.
3. War Is Always a Policy Gamble
So many and so unpredictable are the factors that
operate in war, that high confidence prior to hostilities
is likely to prove ill founded. It is a problem for the
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United States that its own status and capabilities are
so high. It can prove almost impossibly challenging for
Americans to understand just how much, or how little,
military effort to exert in order to bring a local conflict to
a successful conclusion. Since 1945, the U.S. Army has
drawn one conflict in Korea, undoubtedly lost another
in Vietnam, and at best has not obviously succeeded
in two others in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the negative
cases just cited, the core of the Army’s problem set was
the same; it was committed to combat in a country that
was culturally too alien for it to be able to convert its tactical prowess into meaningful strategic gain for political purpose. The political purpose is what the exercise
of American military power has to be about. In war
after war, from the 1960s to the 2000s, the U.S. Army
was partially engaged in countries whose cultures and
even politics were substantially mysterious to America’s political leaders and most American voters. This
extensive and intensive asymmetry contributed hugely
to U.S. military and political failure in South-East Asia
and the Middle East. Strange to say, perhaps, but
war—any war—is always a political gamble. This is as
true for a superpower as for states much smaller than
the United States. The general strength of this point is
probably less than—let alone fully—well understood,
even in the U.S. Army. The extensive and genuine military virtue of this Army ironically may hinder comprehension of its relative weakness when it strives to
counter hostilities significantly foreign to Americans.
Policy decisions to commit the U.S. Army to a war are
always going to be highly risky, because of the large
number and character of uncertainties.
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4. War Should Only Be Waged with Strategic Sense.
It is a vitally important definitional truth that war
ought only and always to be waged with what some
insightful historians have termed “strategic sense.”29
There should be no misunderstanding of the relative
importance and significance of this recommendation
to the Army. Tactics and even operations will be the
regular actuality of military behavior of the U.S. Army
in a zone of conflict, but we must never lose sight of the
whole political point of the death, destruction, and disturbance that we cause and promote. In an army such
as the American where politics is eschewed, as well as
unprofessional, it can prove difficult for the military
strategy to remain apolitical. This strategy should cap
and exploit tactics and operations, but not leak or stray
into the realm of policy with its ineradicable politics.
Despite the legal and professional cultural inhibitions
that always will work overtime to be difficult, there can
be no prudent way in which to seek to escape the necessity for the U.S. Army only to be wielded as a sharp
military instrument in execution or support of a clear
political purpose. The separation of the military from
the world of politics is a deep and important value in
American public culture. Nonetheless, the separation
cannot be permitted to license, if not actually encourage, a foolish distancing of our Army’s actions from
our society’s high political and moral intentions.
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